Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Steve Coughlan

2011

R. v. Ryan - Duress is Not Necessary Where
Necessity is Sufficient
Steve Coughlan, Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/stephen-coughlan/12/

R. v. Ryan: Duress is Not Necessary Where Necessity is
Sufficient
Steve Coughlan*
The accused's claim in R. v. Ryan^ that she committed an offence in response to a history of abuse is, at a factual level, stronger than that in the
landmark case of R. v. Lavallee,2 which first established the relevance of
such a claim to criminal defences. In each case there was expert evidence
about the accused's psychological condition. In Ryan, however, the accused herself testified at length about events over a period of many years
and her evidence was accepted by the trial judge, unlike Lavallee where
the accused did not testify at all. Further, the threats of death in Ryan
were not merely to the accused but to her daughter as well. Finally, the
Crown in Lavallee characterized as a "myth" her claim to have been battered; in Ryan, the Crown had the opportunity to call the accused's husband, but he did not in fact testify, a point the trial judge took note of. It
should come as little surprise, then, that the trial judge and Court of Appeal reached the conclusion that the accused in Ryan was entitled to a
defence.
That said, it is with respect difficult to understand why that defence
should be duress. The Court of Appeal notes that duress has always been
understood to apply only in cases where an accused, because of threats
by one person, commits an offence against a third party. One might
phrase this differently and say that duress applies where a person is
threatened with consequences unless they commit a specified offence. In
either case, to change duress and allow it to apply where the accused
commits an offence against the person who makes the threat (rather than
the offence specified, or in the complete absence of any such specified
offence) introduces conceptual confusion, blurs the distinction between
various defences and makes it difficult to know how properly to apply
them in the future. This might be justifiable if it were the only way to
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prevent an accused who ought to have a defence from being found guilty.
That is not, however, the situation here. Rather, the accused's claim
could, without any need to create new law or blur distinctions, have been
successfully argued based on necessity.
The defence of necessity, as described in Perka v. /?.-* and R. v. Larimer^
consists of three requirements: urgent circumstances of imminent peril,
no reasonable legal alternative, and proportionality. Those are exactly the
issues analysed by the Court of Appeal in its decision here, and so the
reasons they offer could equally well be used to show that the necessity
defence succeeds. Indeed, the Court of Appeal refers to duress as a "subset of necessity" which is based on the same juridical foundation.5
Analysing the situation based on the already-wider rule would therefore
avoid the need to expand duress and thereby blur its conceptual lines.
Indeed, one might note that the difference in this case is that the threats
did not direct the accused to commit an offence: they created circumstances in response to which the accused committed an offence. The Supreme Court of Canada talked about exactly this distinction in R. v.
Ruzic,6 in discussing the terminology used in England to refer to what
are in Canada duress and necessity:
Duress by threats is applicable where an accused is threatened by
someone to commit a crime or else risk being physically injured or
killed. Duress of circumstances, which is analogous to our defence of
necessity, is available where an accused commits a crime to avert
death or serious injury, but no person is demanding that he do so.

The circumstances of this offence fall squarely into what is described as
the English "duress of circumstances" defence, which, as the Supreme
Court said, is our defence of necessity.
It is arguable that the Court of Appeal has approached the issue in the
way it has because of the way the question was put before them: whether
the defence can apply "where the targeted victim is the aggressor as op-
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posed to a third party."8 In fact focussing on the target of the offence is a
red herring: the defining characteristic of duress, as Ruzic points out, is
the nature of the threats. Duress can with no re-interpretation be applicable where the target of the offence is the aggressor: "assist me in committing suicide or I will shoot you," for example.
The Court of Appeal suggests there is authority acknowledging the relevance of a history of abuse to a possible claim of duress, and of course
that is correct. However, all of those cases are circumstances where the
victim of abuse has been threatened with consequences unless she commits an offence, which offence was in fact against a third party. The fact
that a history of abuse is relevant to deciding whether an accused's belief
is reasonable is a very distinct issue from whether the accused has been
directed to commit a crime.
On the other hand there is authority for using necessity as a defence
when a person commits an offence in response to a threat made by another person. In R. v. Kerr9 the accused had been threatened by another
inmate in the maximum security institution in which he was confined.
The next day Kerr armed himself with a homemade knife in anticipation
of an attack which did occur. Kerr stabbed and killed his attacker and
was charged with murder and with possession of a weapon for a purpose
dangerous to the public peace. In the Supreme Court the only issue was
whether he was guilty of the latter offence, since he had been acquitted
of murder based on self-defence. Justice LeBel, in his decision, pointed
out that the defence in question for the possession charge was necessity.
Self-defence was not available as a defence against the charge: the issue
was whether the circumstances (the threats by his fellow inmate) created
necessitous circumstances to which the accused had no other legal response and whether the offence committed was proportional to that
threat. Precisely the same reasoning could have been applied here.
There is a further, quite different, point to note about the Court of Appeal's reasoning here in applying duress. As they must, the Court of Appeal looks at duress in s. 17 rather than the common law version of duress. Although they are broadly parallel, one difference between the two
relates to the mental element. The common law defence requires that an
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accused had no safe avenue of escape, and in R. v. Hibbert10 the Supreme Court concluded that that issue was to be considered from the perspective of a reasonable person sharing the accused's characteristics: that
is, it was assessed on a modified objective standard. Section 17, on the
other hand, sets as a condition that "the person believes the threats will
be carried out." The Court of Appeal notes that this is simply a subjective
standard and furthermore suggests that this was a sensible requirement as
the provision was originally drafted, with very strict immediacy and
presence requirements. They then conclude:
It is only with Ruzic's removal of the timing and presence requirements that an objective test became necessary. Therefore, for good
reason, an objective element is now fundamental to this defence.''

At a policy level this observation might be correct. But on what basis,
one must ask, does the Court of Appeal have the authority to include an
objective fault requirement in addition to the subjective test set out in the
Code!
The subjective element in s. 17 is quite anomalous for defences, and as a
matter of criminal law policy the Court of Appeal's position seems like a
sensible argument. Nonetheless, that is not the issue. The Code unambiguously says that the test is subjective: the fact that an objective test
might be better does not clothe the court with the authority to rewrite the
legislation.
It is not a common law defence, where it would be open to a court to
change the elements. There is no suggestion of a Charter claim, which
was the basis upon which the Supreme Court removed the immediacy
and presence requirements. Courts are entitled to interpret ambiguous
terms and should do so in accordance with good policy: they are also
entitled in limited circumstances to rewrite laws as a Charter remedy.
However, none of the circumstances in which a court is entitled to depart
from the clear language of the Code are present here: the fact that the
Court of Appeal concludes an objective test would be better does not by
itself mean that they have the ability to change the law.
Anyone reading the facts of this case is likely to have sympathy for the
accused, and the idea that some defence should be available to her will

l0/?.

v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973, 40 C.R. (4th) 141 (S.C.C.).

*'Ryan, supra at para. 94.

seem correct to many. That goal could have been achieved with less disruption of the ordinary rules and with greater conceptual consistency by
using necessity rather than duress, and that approach would have been
preferable.

